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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
T E A M S T E R S , C H A U F F E U R S 
W A R E H O U S E M E N and H E L P -
E R S , LOCAL U N I O N 222 and 
I,OCAL UNTON 976, 
Plain tiffs-Respondents, 
MOTOR * \ h* .* -;, a corporation, 
Defendant-A ppt > ' 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L A N T 
•• :• . N A T U R E Gl< I'HK I AhU -".:•: • .-
By their amended complaint, respondents sought: 
;
 i i compel appellant to appear and show cause why-
it should not be ordered to join with respondents in the 
submission of a written statement of an alleged griev-
ance to a jointly acceptable and neutral arbitrator: 
(2) an order permitting respondents t< select an arbi-
trator to proceed with the hearing in the event appellant 
failed to so appear; and. (X) in the event the parties 
Case \ " . 
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failed to agree in writing as to the issue to be submitted 
to an arbitrator or failed to agree who the arbitrator 
should be, respondenes sought an order that the alleged 
grievance be submitted to an arbitrator selected by the 
court from a list of names submitted by the parties. 
D I S P O S I T I O N O F CASE 
Appellant appeared at the Order to Show Cause 
hearing and the same was denied. The Court further 
ordered that the matter be set for trial within sixty 
(60) days (R.31) . 
After the trial, the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, The Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, sitting without a jury, entered Judgment 
compelling arbitration of the alleged grievance and ap-
pointed Mr. Joseph C. Fratto as the arbitrator to hear 
the matter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment dated 
the 13th day of March, 1974, and a direction from this 
Court that an arbitrable dispute does not exist between 
the parties. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On or about the 19th day of November, 1972, the 
parties entered into a Collective Bargaining Labor 
Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement." 
At the time the Agreement was ratified by the union 
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membership, tin company maintained a Company In-
surance Plan with the Hon le Insurance Company. 
During the collective bargaining between the parties, 
the premium for said plan amounted to approximately 
$29.00 per month per employee and shortly after rati-
fication, the premium was increased to $31.00 per month 
per employee (R. 61) The premiums for tin* company 
plan were ft illy paid by appellant with no contribution 
by the covered employees (R 63) 
i'L llnmt l,iiV Insurance Company notified ap-
pellant oh . ! a!«< ui tli IM tiny nf June, 1973, that the 
company plan premium was to be increased to the 
amount of $41.24 per employee per month (R. 61). 
This increase was for the same coverage previously 
provided by the existing plan and -si not cover any 
modifications or increases in benefits (R. 61) Appel-
lant was dissatisfied with the premium increase by its 
existing carrier without concurrent advantages in bene-
fits and ultimately substituted an insurance plan pro-
vided by Blue Cross-Blue Shield at a premium of $40.20 
per employee per month (R. 62 
During the pro** ss of .list routing enrollment cards 
lo employees desiring coverage under the new plan, Mr. 
Larry Peterson, appellant's claim manager, explained 
to respondent«' union steward. Mr, Randy Robinson, 
that, 
" "[\V je had goi.; '.'U' .;:••; done suinc --ho|i- -
ping 1<> \ry and find a better pro^rmn for. yon 
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i I know, less, which we did. We were going to 
have to pay it anyway." (R. 61) 
This discussion between Mr. Peterson and Mr. 
Robinson occurred approximately July 25, 1973 (R. 
60). The enrollment process was completed and the 
Blue Cross-Blue Shield policy went into effect August 
1, 1973 (R. 58). 
On September 16 or 17, 1973, Randy Robinson 
telephoned Mr. Neldin Stephenson, business represen-
tative for Local 222, and advised Mr. Stephenson of 
his understanding that appellant had acquired a new 
health and welfare plan with Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
that was better than the old plan previously maintained 
with Home Life (R. 51). Mr. Robinson did not have 
a copy of the new plan but within a day or two was 
able to obtain a copy and furnish the same to Mr. 
Stephenson (R. 51). 
A meeting between respondents and appellant's 
representatives was held on the 24th day of September, 
1973, at which time respondents requested arbitration 
and appellant replied that the subject was not an arbi-
trable item under the terms of the contract (R. 54). 
The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the 
parties was not received into evidence at the trial of 
this matter. A copy of an Agreement was attached to 
respondents' original complaint filed November 28, 
1973, but no agreement is attached to respondents' 
amended complaint filed December 6, 1973. Appellant's 
answer admits that respondents and appellant entered 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
into a Collective Bargaining Labor Agreement on or 
about the 19th day of November, 1972, affirmatively 
alleges that the Agreement speaks for itself and, further, 
denies each and every allegation set forth in respondents' 
amended complaint not specifically admitted. 
In addition, the record does not include either the 
Home Life Insurance Company Plan or the Blue Cross-
Blue Shield plan. At the trial, the Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield plan was introduced and received into evidence 
as Exhibit 1-P (R. 15), but at the conclusion of the 
hearing, the same was withdrawn by respondents' coun-
sel (R. 72). 
Notwithstanding the complete lack of any evidence, 
either documentary or through testimony, the lower 
court entered judgment against appellant, 
"[T]hat the labor dispute between the parties 
involving an increase in the benefits provided 
by the defendant for its employees who selected 
the Company Plan of benefits, be, and it is 
hereby, required to be submitted to an arbitra-
tor for a decision and resolution of the dispute." 
(R. 18) 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E R E C O R D I S C O M P L E T E L Y 
D E V O I D O F A N Y E V I D E N C E 
E S T A B L I S H I N G A P P E L L A N T S 
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CONTRACTUAL O B L I G A T I O N TO 
A R B I T R A T E . 
I t is well settled that the duty to arbitrate is con-
tractual and a party may not be compelled to arbitrate 
an issue that he has not contractually agreed to arbitrate. 
As stated in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 
U.S. 543, 11 L.Ed.2d 898, 84 S.Ct. 909 (1954), at 11 
L.Ed.2d 903: 
"The duty to arbitrate being of contractual 
origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration 
cannot precede judicial determination that the 
collective bargaining agreement does in fact 
create such a duty. Thus, just as an employer 
has no obligation to arbitrate issues which it 
has not agreed to arbitrate, so a fortioro, it 
cannot be compelled to arbitrate if an arbitra-
tion clause does not bind it at all." 
The contractual obligation of appellant to arbitrate 
respondents' alleged grievance has not been estab-
lished in this proceeding because the agreement pur-
portedly establishing and defining such an obligation 
is not before the Court. 
Respondents' original complaint and the exhibits 
attached thereto were superseded by respondents' sub-
sequent filing of an amended complaint. As stated in 
67 Am Jur 2d, Pleading §334, at 739-740: 
An amended pleading which is complete in 
itself and does not refer to or adopt a former 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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pleading as a part of it supersedes the former 
pleading. The original pleading is abandoned 
by the amendment and is no longer a part of 
the pleaders averments against his adversary, 
and the plaintiff cannot avail himself of the 
allegations contained in the superseded plead-
ing, unless they are set out in the amended 
pleading or referred to therein. 
In this proceeding, respondents' amended com-
plaint is complete in itself and, although the same re-
fers to the subject agreement, a copy thereof is not 
attached. Appellant's answer admits the execution of 
an agreement, affirmatively alleges that the agreement 
would speak for itself, and does not admit the contents 
as alleged by respondents. By the pleadings, the exis-
tence and scope of the obligation to arbitrate were dis-
puted issues and respondents' failure to establish both 
considerations is fatal. 
Appellant submits that an exhibit to a superseded 
pleading is not within the scope of the evidence to be 
considered in determining the rights of party litigants. 
The authenticity thereof must be established by compe-
tent evidence the same as any other disputed fact. 
Without the subject agreement in evidence, the 
court had no basis on which to determine the primary 
issues of appellant's obligation to arbitrate or the scope 
of the issues designated by the agreement as appropriate 
for arbitration. Such a devoid record may not support 
an order compelling arbitration and the matter must 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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be remitted to the lower court for a determination of 
whether the agreement in fact creates an obligation on 
appellant to arbitrate this particular dispute. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E R E C O R D I S C O M P L E T E L Y 
D E V O I D O F A N Y E V I D E N C E TO 
S U P P O R T T H E L O W E R C O U R T S 
D E T E R M I N A T I O N T H A T A P P E L -
L A N T H A D I N C R E A S E D T H E 
B E N E F I T S P R O V I D E D BY I T S COM-
P A N Y I N S U R A N C E P L A N . 
The alleged grievance which respondents seek to com-
pel appellant to submit to arbitration is allegedly in 
respondents' amended complaint to be, 
"[T]hat (appellant) has materially and sub-
stantially increased the benefits of the 'Barton 
Truck Line Company Plan' (appellant), 
which violation constitutes a grievance as to 
those certain employees who exercised their 
option to select (respondents' insurance plan) 
* * * " (R.33) 
Appellant specifically denied that it had increased 
the benefits provided for in the Company Insurance 
Plan and affirmatively alleged that the payment of the 
increased premium was necessary to preserve the plan 
or its equivalent (R.23). However, respondents' allega-
tion was set forth virtually word for word as paragraph 
7 of the lower court's Findings of Fact (R. 16). 
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Neither the Home Life Insurance Company Plan 
nor the Blue Cross-Blue Shield Plan were introduced 
into evidence. In addition, neither plan was attached as 
an exhibit to any pleading filed by respondents and no 
witness testified as to the relative benefits of each plan. 
Without either plan being in evidence so that a com-
parative analysis could be made, or oral testimony dis-
tinguishing the various benefits, there is no competent 
evidence on which to support a finding, conclusion or 
judgment by the lower court that there was an increase 
in benefits provided by one plan over the other. I t is 
difficult to conduct a prolonged argument with respect 
to the insufficiency of the record in this regard and the 
only appropriate comment is that the record, like a 
written contract or insurance plan, speaks for itself. 
Appellant recognizes the general rule that where 
findings of fact are based on conflicting evidence, the 
same must stand unless against the clear preponderance 
of the evidence. Mollerup v. Daynes-Beebe Music Com-
pany, 82 Utah 299, 24 P.2d 306 (1933). However, the 
correlary is also true in that findings not supported by 
the evidence must be vacated. In this proceeding, there 
is no conflicting evidence relating to the alleged increase 
in benefits in appellant's presently effective insurance 
plan. There is simply no evidence with respect to this 
issue at all. Therefore, any finding upholding respon-
dents' allegation of an increase in benefits must be va-
cated and the judgment thereon reversed. 
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> ^ P O I N T I I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N 
D E T E R M I N I N G T H A T R E S P O N -
D E N T S H A D T I M E L Y R E Q U E S T E D 
A R B I T R A T I O N P U R S U A N T TO T H E 
R E Q U I R E M E N T S OF T H E A G R E E -
M E N T . 
Appellant's Answer admitted that portion of re-
spondents' amended complaint wherein it was alleged 
that Article X X of the Agreement provides that arbi-
tration must be requested, 
"[i]n a timely manner within thirty (30) 
calendar days of the original event of the 
grievance." (R. 24) 
At the beginning of the trial, the lower court stated that 
the only issue to be considered that particular day was 
the issue relating to the timeliness of respondents' re-
quest for arbitration and whether the same conformed 
to the requirement that arbitration must be requested 
within thirty (30) calendar days of the original event 
of the grievance. 
Respondents' testimony on this issue was supplied 
by Mr. Neldin Stephenson who testified that on Septem-
ber 16 or 17, 1973, he was advised by the union steward 
that appellant had obtained a new health and welfare 
plan (R. 50, 51) and that a copy of the plan was furn-
ished on or about the 18th or 19th day of September, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1973 (R. 51). Thereafter, the company's request to 
submit the issue of the alleged increase in benefits to 
an arbitrator was refused by appellant. 
Appellant's testimony was supplied by Mr. Larry 
Peterson who testified that on or about July 25, 1973, 
during the process of distributing enrollment cards for 
the new plan, Mr. Peterson advised the union steward 
that appellant was obtaining a new program because the 
old carrier had increased the premium without any 
change in benefits (R. 60, 61). Mr. Peterson further 
testified that the new policy went into effect August 1, 
1973, (R. 58). 
I t may be noted that Mr. Stephenson and Mr. 
Peterson were the only witnesses to testify at the trial 
and their testimony was limited to the issue relating to 
the timeliness of respondents' request for arbitration. 
Appellant submits that by its finding that respon-
dents had timely requested arbitration, the lower court 
effectively rewrote this particular contractural provision. 
The contract is not ambiguous and specifically requires 
a request for arbitration within thirty (30) calendar 
days of the original event of the grievance. The con-
tractual provision as rewritten by the lower court now 
requires a request for arbitration within thirty (30) 
calendar days after notice by the unions of the original 
event of the grievance. Appellant's contractual obliga-
tion has thus been modified by a condition interjected 
into the contract after the same has taken effect. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Respondents specifically claim that the grievance 
giving rise to the demand for arbitration is that appel-
lant increased the benefits of its company insurance 
plan. The undisputed evidence is that the new plan 
went into effect August 1, 1973, and this is clearly the, 
" . . . original event of the grievance" identified in the 
agreement. A request for arbitration made approxi-
mately seven weeks after the original event of the griev-
ance is clearly untimely. Even assuming for the pur-
poses of this argument that the issue between the parties 
is a proper subject for arbitration, the contractual obli-
gation of appellant to submit to arbitration is further 
limited by the requirement that a request for arbitration 
be timely. The timeliness of the request is as critical to 
the submission of the issue to an arbitrator as is the 
contractual requirement that a particular item is a proper 
subject for arbitration. As stated in 51 A.C.J.S. Labor 
Relations, §467(b) at 459, 
"Conditions precedent and preliminary steps 
called for by the contract must be complied 
with before the arbitration provision may be 
invoked •***" 
There was no contention by respondents that appel-
lant purposely tried to conceal the implementation of 
the new plan from the union membership, the union 
steward or union officials. As a matter of fact, respon-
dents' counsel conceded that possible concealment was 
not an issue and the court properly observed, 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
"I t isn't. There is no evidence that there was." 
(R. 62) 
The final observation to be made with respect to 
the timeliness of respondents' request for arbitration 
is that respondents, through their own union steward, 
had notice that appellant was adopting a new insurance 
program on or about the 25th day of July, 1973. The 
evident failure of the union steward to report this de-
velopment to his superiors is not a sufficient excuse to 
relieve respondents from the requirement of their col-
lective bargaining agreement. I t is interesting to note 
that when Mr. Stephenson requested the union steward 
to obtain a copy of the new plan, the same was accom-
plished within one or two days. This same request for 
a copy of the new plan could and should have been made 
by the union steward when he was advised of its antici-
pated adoption on July 25, 1973. A copy could have 
been reviewed by respondents prior to the plan's effec-
tive date of August 1, 1973, and the proper procedures 
pursued. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the lower court 
erred in rewriting the contract to require a request for 
arbitration within thirty (30) calendar days after union 
notice as against the written requirement of a request, 
" . . . within thirty (30) calendar days of the original 
event of the grievance"; and, in failing to determine 
that the union did have notice of the anticipated adoption 
and failed to pursue its remedies in a reasonable fashion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment 
of the lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND RICHARDS 
By 
Gary A. Frank 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
1515 Walker Bank Building 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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